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Abstract
Bester and Strausz (2000) showed that the revelation principle of Bester
and Strausz (2001) does not apply in a setting of many agents and no com-
mitment. In their counterexample only one agent has private information.
We show that if the parties can make ex ante transfers the revelation prin-
ciple does extend to this setting. However, we show that it does not extend
to a setting in which more than one agent has private information.
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1 Introduction
In many contracting situations, the parties are unable fully to commit
to ex post actions. For examples of analysis of a variety of such situations,
see La¤ont and Tirole (1988), Khalil (1997), Crawford and Sobel (1982),
Dewatripont (1989). One di¢ culty with analyzing such models is that the
revelation principle (Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin, 1979) does not apply.
Bester and Strausz (2001), however, showed that a variant of the revelation
principle does apply in some environments without commitment. More pre-
cisely, they showed that in a model with a principal and one agent, for any
incentive-e¢ cient equilibrium of an arbitrary mechanism, there is an equilib-
rium of a direct mechanism in which each type of the agent gets the same
payo¤ and the principal gets the same or more.
In a companion paper (Bester and Strausz, 2000) they showed that this
result does not extend to the multi-agent case. The counterexample has two
agents, only one of whom (agent 1) has private information. Agent 1 has two
possible types. They exhibit an equilibrium, say , for a mechanism   with
three messages for agent 1 such that any equilibrium of any two-message
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mechanism  0 gives a lower payo¤ either to the principal or to agent 2. Thus
a mechanism with two messages cannot replicate or improve on the outcome
of the mechanism with three messages.
However, in this example, one can construct an equilibrium of  0 in which
both types of agent 1 get the same payo¤as in  and the sum of the principals
and agent 2s payo¤ is higher. Therefore, if the players have quasi-linear
utility for money and they can make ex ante transfers, it is possible in  0
for agent 2 and each type of agent 1 to get the same payo¤ as in  and for
the principal to get more. The case of quasi-linear utility is a leading one
in contract theory and it requires negligible, if any, commitment to make ex
ante transfers.
In this paper we show that the Bester-Strausz result extends to the multi-
agent case with quasi-linear utilities and ex ante transfers if only one agent
has private information. We also examine the case in which more than one
agent has private information. We provide an example with two agents, each
of whom has two types, and an equilibrium  of a mechanism with three
messages for agent 1 and two for agent 2, such that any equilibrium of a
mechanism with two messages each has a lower total payo¤ than  ex ante
(i.e., evaluated before players learn their types). Therefore it is not possible
in such a mechanism to make each type of each player as well o¤ as in .
The conclusion is that in this setting the revelation principle fails to hold
when there are at least two agents, but only if at least two agents have private
information.
2 Model
There is a principal (P ) and 2 agents (1 and 2). 1 is privately informed
about his type i 2  = f1; :::; Ig. The probability that 1 is of type i
is denoted by i and we assume that this is common knowledge. 2 has no
private information.3 P can choose an action y 2 Y . We allow parties
to make transfers which enter into payo¤s in an additively separable way.
Thus, for given action y, 1s type i and transfers t = (t1; t2), where tj is the
payment from P to j 2 f1; 2g, we denote Ps payo¤ by Vi(y)   t1   t2 and
the agentspayo¤s by U ji (y) + t
j.4
A mechanism   species a nite message space M = fm1; :::;mHg for
3The set-up can be extended to n agents, only one of whom has private information.
4We assume that parties valuation of money is una¤ected by agent 1s type. This
assumption could be relaxed but it would introduce more notation.
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1 and a pair of transfers t. The mechanism induces a two-stage game of
incomplete information, in which 1 chooses, for each type i, a probability
distribution qi() over M . On receipt of message mh, P updates his beliefs
about 1s type to p(mh) = (p1(mh); :::; pI(mh)) and then chooses an action
y(mh). Let q() = (q1(); :::; qI()) and denote by q(mh) =
P
i iqi(mh) the
overall probability that message mh is sent. The prole (q(), p(), y()) con-
stitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game induced by mechanism
  if (i) for each mh, y(mh) maximizes Ps expected payo¤ given his belief
pi(mh), (ii) for each i, q() maximizes 1s expected payo¤ given y(:), and
(iii) p(:) follows BayesRule whenever possible.
3 A Revelation Principle
For a given mechanism   = [M; t], is it possible to replicate the same (or
higher) payo¤s for all parties with a direct mechanism  d = [; td]? Bester
and Strausz (2001) showed that with only one agent, without transfers, the
answer to this question is yes. The Bester and Strausz (2000) example,
however, showed that this is not necessarily true if there are at least two
agents. The example has  = f1; 2g; Y = <, V1(y) =  y2, V2(y) =
 (2 y)2, U11 (y) =  (0:5 y)2, U12 (y) =  (1:5 y)2 and U2i (y) =  10(1 y)2,
for i = 1; 2. They exhibit an equilibrium for an M with three messages in
which P gets  0:5, each type of 1 gets  0:25, and 2 gets  5 and show that
no equilibrium for an M with two messages can replicate or improve on this
outcome. However, with two messages, the pooling equilibrium with equal
weight on each message gives  1 to P ,  0:25 to each type of 1 and 0 to 2,
so if transfers were possible each type of each player could be made at least
as well o¤.
In this section we show that the Bester-Strausz revelation principle ex-
tends to the set-up of section 2. The argument is closely based on theirs, but
we include it here for completeness.
We say that  = (q; p; y; tjM) is incentive-feasible if (q; p; y) is a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism [M; t]. Slightly
abusing notation, we denote the expected payo¤s in this equilibrium by V (),
U1i () and U
2().
Denition 1  = (q; p; y; tjM) is incentive-e¢ cient if it is incentive-
feasible and there exists no other incentive-feasible  0 = (q0; p0; y0; t0jM) such
that V ( 0) > V (), U1i () = U
1
i (
0) for all i and U2() = U2( 0).
This is a direct extension of the notion of incentive e¢ ciency in Bester
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and Strausz (2001). Consider another denition:
Denition 2  = (q; p; y; tjM) is incentive-e¢ cient if it is incentive-
feasible and there exists no other incentive-feasible  0 = (q0; p0; y0; t0jM) such
that V ( 0) + U2( 0) > V () + U 2 () and U1i (
0) = U1i () for all i.
It is easy to see that in our setting, with monetary transfers, these two
denitions are equivalent. If  fails Denition 2 (P and agent 2 can jointly be
made better o¤) then for an appropriate choice of transfer t0 it fails Denition
1 (P can be made better o¤ and agent 2 at least as well o¤).
We now argue that Denition 2 allows us to apply the same logic as in
Bester and Strausz (2001) to prove the revelation principle in our set-up.
The argument establishes that for any incentive-e¢ cient  = (q; p; y; tjM) it
is possible to nd an incentive feasible  0 = (q0; p; y; tjM 0) with jM 0j  I that
gives the same joint payo¤ to the principal and agent 2 and the same payo¤
to each type of agent 1.
Let q0 be a -perturbation of q if (a) q0i(mh) > 0 implies that qi(mh) > 0
and (b) p0(:) = p(:) where p0(:) [resp. p(:)] is a belief derived from q0 [resp.
q] via Bayes rule. In that case if (q; p; y; tjM) is incentive-feasible then
(q0; p; y; tjM 0) is incentive-feasible for any M 0 M containing the support of
q0. This is because, for any mh, p(mh) is the correct belief for P and y(mh)
is optimal given p(mh), and each type i of agent 1 puts positive probability
only on messages in the support of qi (i.e. optimal messages, given y(:)).
Furthermore, for each type of agent 1, (q; p; y; tjM) and (q0; p; y; tjM 0) give
the same expected payo¤.
Suppose that  = (q; p; y; tjM) is incentive-e¢ cient according to Den-
ition 2, and jM j > I, with q(mh) > 0 for each mh 2 M . Consider the
following class of -perturbations of q. q0i(mh) = hqi(mh) for all i, where
h  0 for all h;
X
h
hqi(mh) = 1 for all i: (1)
By incentive-e¢ ciency no such perturbation can increase V +U2 and so  =
(1; : : : ; 1) maximizes
P
mh
h
P
i iqi(mh)[Vi(y(mh)) +U
2
i (y(mh))] subject to
(1). This implies that, for all mh such that q(mh) > 0,X
i
[Vi(y(mh)) + U
2
i (y(mh))]pi(mh) =
X
i
~ipi(mh) (2)
for some constants f~igi (cf. Lemma 1 in Bester and Strausz (2001)).
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Since
P
mh
q(mh)pi(mh) = i,  2 <I is a convex combination of the jM j
posterior beliefs p(mh). Therefore  can be expressed as a convex combi-
nation of I of these vectors, corresponding to a subset M 0 of the messages
with jM 0j  I:  = Pmh2M 0 hp(mh). Given mh 2 M 0, let q0i(mh) =
(i)
 1hpi(mh) and let q0i(mh) = 0 if mh =2 M 0. q0 is a -perturbation
of q since, for each mh, each type of agent 1 re-scales its probability of
mh in the same way. Therefore  0 = (q0; p; y; tjM 0) is incentive-feasible and
U1i (
0) = U1i () for all i. We need to show that V (
0)+U2( 0) = V ()+U2():
this will establish that, choosing an appropriate t0, we can nd a PBE which
is payo¤-equivalent to  and which uses only I messages. But
V () + U2() =
X
mh
q(mh)
X
i
[Vi(y(mh)) + U
2
i (y(mh))]pi(mh)
=
X
mh
q(mh)
X
i
~ipi(mh) =
X
mh
X
i
iqi(mh)~i =
X
i
i~i;
where the second equality comes from (2) and the third from Bayesrule.
Similarly,
V ( 0) + U2( 0) =
X
mh
q0(mh)
X
i
[Vi(y(mh)) + U
2
i (y(mh))]pi(mh) =
X
i
i~i:
Hence, since we can identify M 0 with the set of types , we have
Proposition If  = (q; p; y; tjM) is incentive-e¢ cient, then there exists a
direct mechanism  d = (; td) and an incentive-feasible  d = (qd; pd; yd; tdj)
such that  and  d are payo¤-equivalent.5
4 Two privately informed agents
Here we consider an example in which the agents, 1 and 2, are both
privately informed about their types. There are two types, a and b, and
each agent, independently, has probability 0.5 of being each type. There-
fore there are four equally likely states of nature, aa; ab; ba and bb, where
the rst letter refers to 1s type and the second to 2s. Ps action set is
fyaa; yab; yba; ybb; yca; ycbg and his payo¤ as a function of the state of nature
and his chosen action are given in the following matrix:
5Applying the Marriage Theorem (Weyl (1949)), one can show that qdi (i) > 0.
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yaa yab yba ybb yca ycb
aa 1 0  1 0 3
4
0
ab 0 1 0  1 0 3
4
ba  1 0 1 0 3
4
0
bb 0  1 0 1 0 3
4
The matrix below gives, for each type of each agent, the agents payo¤ as
a function of Ps action. For example, the top row is the payo¤ function of
1a, type a of agent 1.
yaa yab yba ybb yca ycb
1a 1 0 0  1 1
2
1
2
1b 0  1 1 0 1
2
1
2
2a 0 1 0 1 0  2
2b 0 1 0 1  2 0
We refer to the beliefs and strategy of P in any given equilibrium6 as
follows. After 1 has sent message mk and 2 has sent message ml Ps equi-
librium action, if pure, is denoted by y(mk;ml), his belief (probability) that
1 is type a is p1(mk) and his belief that 2 is type a is p2(ml). Mixed strate-
gies of the agents are denoted by q1i and q
2
j : thus, for example, q
1
a(m) is the
probability that type a of agent 1 sends message m. For an equilibrium  ,
V (); U1i (); U
2
j () refer, respectively, to the expected payo¤s of P , type i of
1 and type j of 2 (i; j 2 fa; bg). All proofs are in the Appendix.
First, consider a mechanism with no transfers,   = [M1;M2], in which
agent 1s message space M1 contains three messages, ma, mb and mc, and
agent 2s message space M2 contains two messages, ma and mb.
Claim 1 The mechanism   has an equilibrium in which 1a sends mes-
sages ma and mc with equal probability, 1b sends messages mb and mc with
equal probability, and agent 2 separates - 2a sends message ma and 2b sends
message mb. The total ex ante expected equilibrium payo¤ is 138 .
In the remainder of the section we show that any mechanism  0 that
uses just two messages for each agent must, in any equilibrium, have an ex
ante total payo¤ below 13
8
. Suppose that M1 = M2 = fma;mbg. Since the
6This refers to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; see Denition 8.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991).
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meaning of messages is arbitrary and the prior is uniform, it is without loss
of generality to assume that pi(ma)  12 and pi(mb)  12 for i = 1; 2.
The diagram below represents Ps optimal action as a function of his
posterior beliefs (p1; p2). For example, yaa is optimal if and only if p1  78
and p2  1
2
.
-
p1
6
p2
(0; 0) (1; 0)
(0; 1)
1
2
1
8
7
8
ybb
yba
ycb
yca
yab
yaa
First, consider equilibria in which the action is in the set fyca; ycbg with
probability 1. There are many such equilibria, with 2 pooling or sepa-
rating and 1 pooling or partially separating. For example, one is as fol-
lows: q1a(ma) = q
1
a(mb) = q
1
b (ma) = q
1
b (mb) =
1
2
, q2a(ma) = q
2
b (mb) = 1,
y(:;mi) = yci. In any such equilibrium, 1 gets 12 , 2 gets at most 0, and P gets
at most 3
4
, so the total ex ante expected payo¤ is at most 10
8
.
Next, we look for equilibria with strictly positive probability on the set
fyaa; yab; yba; ybbg. In that case, p1(ma) 2 (12 ; 1] since, if p1(ma) = 12 , either
p1(mb) =
1
2
or both types of 1 sendma with probability 1, which would imply
pr(fyca; ycbg) = 1. We distinguish the cases p1(ma) 2 (12 ; 1) and p1(ma) = 1:
Claim 2 In any equilibrium of  0 with pr(fyaa; yab; yba; ybbg) > 0 and
p1(ma) 2 (12 ; 1),
(i) 1a sends message ma for sure and 1b sends both messages with strictly
positive probability,
(ii) if p2(ma) > 12 > p
2(mb), 2a sends message ma for sure, 2b sends
message mb for sure and the total payo¤ is less than 138 ,
(iii) if p2(m) = 1
2
for any positive probability message m, the total payo¤ is
less than 12
8
.
Turning to p1(ma) = 1, note that by the symmetry of the game, we
have already considered all cases in which p1(mb) 2 (0; 12 ]. So it remains to
consider the case p1(ma) = 1; p1(mb) = 0:
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Claim 3 In any equilibrium of  0 with pr(fyaa; yab; yba; ybbg) > 0, if 1a
sends ma and 1b sends mb for sure, p2(m) = 12 for any positive probability
message m and the total payo¤ is less than 12
8
.
In the equilibrium of the three-message mechanism   in Claim 1 agent
2 separates. To achieve this separation P needs to put positive probability
on the set fyca, ycbg since agent 2s types have the same preferences over the
other actions. If P cannot commit he will not play these actions unless he is
unsure about agent 1s type. Hence, 1 must pool to some extent. However,
pooling by 1 is costly and the optimal degree of separation requires three
messages rather than two.
It is therefore the interplay between the incentives of the two privately
informed agents that leads to a failure of the Revelation Principle.
5 Appendix
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose Ps beliefs and action rule are:
(ma;ma) (ma;mb) (mb;ma) (mb;mb) (mc;ma) (mc;mb)
(p1; p2) (1; 1) (1; 0) (0; 1) (0; 0)
 
1
2
; 1
  
1
2
; 0

y yaa yab yba ybb yca ycb
Clearly the beliefs satisfy Bayesrule given the agentsstrategies and the action
rule is optimal for P given the beliefs. If 1 sends messagemk, k = a; b; c, he expects
P to choose yka or ykb, with equal probability. Thus, 1a gets expected payo¤
1
2
from ma,  12 from mb and 12 from mc, so is willing to randomize between ma
and mc. The argument for 1b is symmetric. If 2 sends message ml, l = a; b, he
expects P to choose yal and ybl each with probability
1
4
, and ycl with probability
1
2
. Thus, 2a gets 0 from ma and  12 from mb while 2b gets  1 from ma and 12
from mb. Therefore the given strategies form an equilibrium. In each state, P is
equally likely to get 1 or 3
4
, so his expected payo¤ is 7
8
. 2as is 0, 2bs is 1
2
and
both types of 1 get 1
2
. This establishes the claim.
Proof of Claim 2:
(i) If neither type of 1 sends ma then p1(mb) =
1
2
and pr(fyca; ycbg) = 1.
So pr(1 sends ma) > 0. Similarly, pr(1 sends mb) > 0. If q1b (ma) = 0 then
p1(ma) = 1. Hence q1b (ma) > 0. Also, we know that q
1
b (mb) > 0 because
pr(1 sends mb) > 0 and by assumption q1b (mb)  q1a(mb)Let U ij(m) be ijs ex-
pected payo¤ from sending m, for i = 1; 2 and j = a; b.
Since pr(fyaa; yabgj1 sends mb) = pr(fyba; ybbgj1 sends ma) = 0,
U1a (ma)  U1b(ma) = U1b(mb)  U1a(mb)
8
with at least one inequality strict since pr(fyaa; yab; yba; ybbg) > 0. Therefore
U1a (ma) > U
1
a (mb). It follows that 1a does not send mb.
(ii) Note that in this case y(mb;ma) = yba and y(mb;mb) = ybb. First, 2b
strictly prefers ybb to yba and pr(1 sends mb) > 0. Second, 2b (weakly) prefers
any mixture of ycb and yab to any mixture of yca and yaa. So, U2b (mb) > U
2
b(ma).
This shows that 2b only sends mb. Second, because 1b is indi¤erent between ma
and mb we know p1(ma)  78 , otherwise he would prefer mb. If p1(ma) < 78 ;
U1b (ma) =
1
2
and therefore also U1b (mb) =
1
2
. This implies that 2a must send
ma for sure. If p1(ma) =
7
8
; by Bayes rule we must have q1b (ma) =
1
7
and
q1b (mb) =
6
7
. Because U2a (ma) = 0 we need U
2
a (mb) = 0 for 2a to be mixing
between ma and mb: Therefore, after message pair (ma;mb) P must put weights
7
12
and 5
12
on actions ycb and yab respectively. But this contradicts that 1b is
indi¤erent between ma and mb because U1b (mb) =
1+
2
, where  = q2a(mb), and
U1b (ma)  1+2 (( 712)(12)   ( 512))+ (1 2 )(12). This shows that 2a only sends ma.
It follows that U1b (mb) = U
1
b (ma) =
1
2
, which is possible only if p1(ma)  78 ,
y(ma;ma) = yca and y(ma;mb) = ycb. Let  = q
1
b(ma). By Bayesrule,   17 .
So we have U2a = 0; U
2
b =
1
2
(1  ) and V = 1
2
(3
4
) + 1
2
[(1  )(1) + (3
4
)]. The
total expected payo¤ is 13
8
  3
8
< 13
8
.
(iii) Since 2s strategy is pooling, Ps action is uncorrelated with 2s type, so P
cannot get a payo¤of more than 1
2
. Let pr(ybbj1 sendsmb) = pbb, so pr(ybaj1 sends
mb) = 1  pbb. Also, let pr(yaaj1 sendsma) = paa and pr(yabj1 sendsma) = pab.
Then U1a =
1
2
(1  paa   pab) + paa and U1b = 12(1  paa   pab)  pab (since
2b sends ma with positive probability in equilibrium). Therefore 1s ex ante
expected payo¤ is 1
2
  pab. Conditional on 1 sending mb, U2a = U2b = pbb. Condi-
tional on 1 sendingma, U2a  pab and U2b  pab. Letting q1b (mb) = , 2s expected
payo¤ is therefore at most 1
2
pbb+[
1
2
(1  ) + 1
2
]p
ab
. Thus the sum of 1s and 2s
ex ante expected payo¤s is at most 1
2
+(
2
)(pbb   pab)  12+2 . It follows that the
sum of expected payo¤s is less than 12
8
:
Proof of Claim 3: Suppose rst that p2(ma) >
1
2
> p2(mb). Then y(mb;ma)
= yba and y(mb;mb) = ybb. In that case both types of 2 strictly prefer mb so
p2(mb) =
1
2
(contradiction). Therefore p2(m) = 1
2
for any positive probability m.
As in the previous proof, P gets at most 1
2
. Using the same notation as in the previ-
ous proof, 1a gets paa, 1b gets pba= 1  pbb, 2 gets 12pbb+12pab= 12pbb+12(1  paa).
Therefore the total expected payo¤ is at most 3
2
.
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